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Abstract 
Revealed preference evidence, especially based on wage-risk tradeoffs in the labor market, 
provides the primary empirical basis for analyses of the value of statistical life (VSL). This market 
evidence also provides guidance on how VSL varies with age. While labor market studies have generated 
conflicting evidence—some showing that VSL rises with age and others showing that VSL declines with 
age—more refined estimates that take into account the age variation in job fatality risks or life-cycle 
patterns of consumption show an inverted-U relation between the VSL and age. The value of a statistical 
life year shows a similar pattern and is not time-invariant. Applying estimates of the VSL-age relationship 
to an analysis of the Clear Skies initiative illustrates the implications of recognizing the age-VSL 
relationship. 
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Age Differences in the Value of Statistical Life:  
Revealed Preference Evidence 
Joseph E. Aldy and W. Kip Viscusi∗
Section 1: Introduction 
There are no explicit markets for mortality risk reduction. An individual cannot purchase 
“mortality risk reduction” per se. However, individuals implicitly reveal how much they value 
mortality risk reduction in many decisions they make. Spending more to buy safer products or 
driving above the speed limit to save time are examples of risk tradeoffs. This paper examines 
the implications of revealed preferences embodied in labor market decisions. The fatality risk-
money tradeoff is known as the value of statistical life (VSL). In the case of the labor market, the 
VSL is the wage-fatality risk tradeoff revealed by workers’ decisions about how much extra pay 
they require to induce them to accept jobs that pose additional risk.  
A strident and continuing controversy with respect to the value of life has been whether 
the benefit of reducing risks to the old is less than for younger age groups. In particular, should 
there be a so-called “senior discount” when assessing the value of reduced risks to life? This 
question has drawn the attention of policymakers in a number of countries. In 2000, Canada 
employed a VSL for the over-65 population that is 25 percent lower than the VSL for the under-
65 population (Hara and Associates 2000). In 2001, the European Commission recommended 
that member countries use a VSL that declines with age (European Commission 2001). In 2002, 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which has traditionally employed a constant 
value of a statistical life to monetize the benefit value of mortality risk reductions irrespective of 
the age of the affected population, conducted analyses of the Clear Skies initiative that included a 
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“senior discount.”1 This effort to apply such a discount generated a political firestorm and 
ultimately led to abandonment of any age adjustments in benefit values assigned by the EPA.2
This article reviews and assesses the considerable literature on age variation in VSL 
levels as revealed through market decisions, rather than the emerging literature on stated 
preferences, which are elicited through surveys.3 We focus on labor market evidence, although 
we address some similar results from product market decisions. More specifically, we examine 
hedonic, or quality-adjusted, wage studies and hedonic price studies. These analyses use 
econometric tests to analyze the effect of risk on wages or prices, while controlling for other 
aspects of the job or product.  
The next section provides background on the VSL issue and an overview of the theory 
and methods that underlie the revealed preference literature on willingness to pay for mortality 
risk reduction. Section 3 discusses efforts to construct age-specific estimates of the benefits of 
risk reduction through value of statistical life year (VSLY) measures that are derived from labor 
market and product market analyses. Section 4 reviews the literature on how labor market 
compensation for occupational mortality risk varies with age. This discussion is followed in the 
fifth section by a description of the recent empirical literature that has employed age-specific 
occupational mortality risk measures in the labor market analysis. The sixth section assesses the 
policy implications of employing these age-specific VSL measures, focusing particularly on how 
using different VSL measures affects evaluation of the Clear Skies initiative. The final section 
concludes. 
Section 2: Background, Theory, and Methods 
Because of the availability of large individual datasets on workers’ job characteristics, a 
literature of more than a hundred “revealed preference” studies of the labor market has examined 
                                                 
1 In the “senior discount” analyses, the EPA provided two alternatives to account for age. One approach was based 
on a standard value of a statistical life-year approach (VSLY) that explicitly accounts for life expectancy. The 
second approach assumed that individuals over age 70 had a value of statistical life equal to 63 percent of the value 
for those under 70. 
2 For a sense of the political reaction and EPA’s decision to discontinue the use of an age-based value of statistical 
life, see “EPA Drops Age-Based Cost Studies,” New York Times, May 8, 2003; “EPA to Stop ‘Death Discount’ to 
Value New Regulations,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2003; and “Under Fire, EPA Drops the ‘Senior Death 
Discount,’” Washington Post, May 13, 2003. 
3 See Krupnick (2007) for an assessment of the stated preference literature. 
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the wage premiums workers receive for risk.4 The wage premium per unit of fatality risk has 
come to be known as the value of statistical life or VSL. Our concern is how VSL varies with 
age. Do older workers make labor market choices that indicate a steadily declining VSL, as 
would be the case if they were willing to accept lower wages for a given risk as they age? 
Although concern with age variations in VSL is a recent policy development, labor market 
studies have addressed this issue for over two decades.  
Our focus on the labor market is consistent with the central role of labor market evidence 
in setting VSL estimates for environmental policy. In the policy lexicon, the analyst transfers the 
estimate of the fatality risk-money tradeoff from the labor market context to the environmental 
policy context. For more than a decade, the EPA has used a benefit measure for mortality risk 
reduction based on 26 studies, 21 of which focus on income-risk tradeoffs in labor markets (EPA 
1997; Viscusi 1993).  
The transfer of an estimate of willingness-to-pay for risk reduction from the market 
context to the environmental policy context is appropriate when the populations have similar risk 
preferences, and the risk reduction magnitudes are comparable across both contexts. In this case, 
the benefit to an individual from a small risk reduction can be aggregated to a population-level 
estimate. For example, if the average person would be willing to pay $500 to reduce the 
probability of dying by 1 in 10,000, then a population of 10,000 individuals would be willing to 
pay $5 million to prevent one member of that population from dying prematurely. The $5 million 
figure is the VSL. Because it is not possible ex ante to identify the person whose life will be 
saved, this prevented mortality is considered a statistical life. 
There are several reasons for the prominence of issues pertaining to the transfer of VSL 
estimates from labor market contexts to environmental policy contexts. First, the benefits 
estimates for major environmental regulations, especially air quality benefits, are dominated by 
mortality risk reduction. Eighty percent of the more than $22 trillion estimated benefits of the 
Clean Air Act over 1970–1990 resulted from the mortality risk reduction associated with 
declining particulate matter and lead emissions (EPA 1997). If the vast majority of the benefits 
of environmental policy reflect mortality risk reduction, then it is important to use credible and 
robust VSL estimates. Second, there is substantial debate about how the age of populations 
                                                 
4 Refer to Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a detailed review of the revealed preference literature on mortality risk 
valuation. 
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affected by environmental policy should influence benefit values. The elderly benefit 
disproportionately from air quality regulations that reduce particulate matter emissions. For 
example, EPA’s 1999 Tier 2 regulation of the sulfur content of gasoline pursuant to the Clean 
Air Act generated estimated mortality risk reduction benefits of $23 billion annually. The 
average age of the population that received these benefits was estimated to be over 70 years old 
(EPA 1999). The effect of environmental health risks on children has also drawn recent scrutiny 
at the EPA.5 The concentration of benefits at the two tails of the age distribution raises questions 
about applying VSL estimates based on the preferences of the working population, who are on 
average 35–40 years old in the relevant studies. 
VSL over the Life Cycle: Theoretical Foundations 
Why should the willingness to pay for a mortality risk reduction vary with age? 
Researchers have developed an array of theoretical and simulation models to address this 
question. The original models generated results consistent with some basic intuition. Older 
individuals should be willing to pay less for a reduced mortality risk because they are purchasing 
fewer additional years of life expectancy. An individual at age 40 is expected to live another 40 
years, but an individual at age 60 is expected to live only another 23 years (Arias 2004).6 The 40 
year old should value a mortality risk reduction more than the 60 year old, ceteris paribus, 
because there are 17 more expected years at stake for the younger individual.  
The decision to invest in risk reduction is comparable to an individual’s decision to 
consume or invest current income. By foregoing some current consumption now in order to 
invest in risk reduction, the individual increases the probability of enjoying consumption in 
future years. Because the 40 year old expects to have more years of future consumption than the 
60 year old, the 40 year old is willing to forego more current consumption and pay more to 
reduce mortality risk than the 60 year old. There is a higher return on the investment in risk 
reduction for the 40 year old than the 60 year old. 
Taken to the extreme, this analysis suggests that an individual’s willingness to pay for 
mortality risk reduction peaks at birth and declines throughout life. This result also holds for 
                                                 
5 For example, Executive Order 13045 directs regulatory agencies to consider it a high priority to identify, assess, 
and address environmental health and safety risks that disproportionately burden children. 
6 The small chance of death between ages 40 and 60 makes up the difference between a 40 year old expecting to live 
to age 80 and a 60 year old expecting to live to age 83. 
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models that find that individuals borrow and save to ensure that they consume the same amount 
during every year of life. These models arrive at this conclusion by assuming that individuals 
have access to perfect markets for borrowing and annuities (Jones-Lee 1976; Shepard and 
Zeckhauser 1984). This consumption-smoothing result makes it very transparent that willingness 
to pay for risk reduction should increase with more years of life expectancy, because each year is 
characterized by the same amount of consumption. Unfortunately, perfect markets do not exist 
for borrowing or annuities, and resources as well as consumption levels vary considerably over 
the life cycle.  
Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) first explored the effects of imperfect borrowing and 
annuities markets on the VSL relationship in their so-called “Robinson Crusoe” analysis. Their 
model assumes that an individual can save money and consume later out of the savings, but 
cannot borrow against future income or invest in annuities that would pay out during retirement. 
Their numerical simulation suggests that the willingness to pay for a risk reduction increases 
with age among young adults, peaks around age 40, and then declines throughout the rest of life. 
This inverted-U shape of willingness to pay for risk reduction over the life cycle is also evident 
in theory and simulation models by Johansson (1996) and Ehrlich and Yin (2005). Recent work 
by Aldy and Smyth (2007) shows that this inverted-U relationship can also hold when adult 
workers cannot insure against labor income shocks.  
The temporal trajectory of VSL implied by these models is consistent with Johansson’s 
(2002) finding that the willingness to pay for risk reduction should track the life-cycle pattern of 
consumption. For the United States, consumption is strongly linked to labor income for young 
adults, and increases as job compensation increases, until the late 30s or early 40s when adults 
begin to accumulate wealth through saving. Labor income begins to decline in the mid 50s and 
declines substantially after retirement, when individuals draw down their pensions, and 
consumption begins to slowly decline as individuals continue to age. So the increasing part of the 
inverted-U reflects the low consumption individuals have as young adults, and their increasing 
consumption with age increases their willingness to pay for risk reduction. Once their 
consumption begins to flatten out as they start saving, the increase in willingness to pay for risk 
reduction slows down and eventually peaks. At this stage of the life cycle, the phenomenon that 
fewer remaining years of life expectancy explains willingness to pay for risk reduction begins to 
dominate. Elderly individuals, who consume less with each year, may reduce their willingness to 
pay even faster with age. 
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Hedonic Model Frameworks  
Individuals reveal their willingness to pay for lower mortality risk in labor markets by 
making decisions that involve tradeoffs between wages and risk.7 This notion dates back to 
Adam Smith (1776), who observed that “the wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the 
cleanliness or dirtiness, the honourableness or dishonourableness of the employment” (p. 112). 
To assess this phenomenon in real-world labor markets requires more than a casual comparison 
of wages and salaries and occupational mortality risk. The safest jobs tend to be the highest paid 
because of the positive income elasticity of the demand for safety and because the safest jobs 
tend to require more skills and education. The pertinent economic question is how much extra 
pay a worker requires to bear extra risk for a given set of job opportunities.  
The hedonic market equilibrium is the result of market offers of wages for jobs of 
different risk and the choices of workers from among the available set of opportunities. Consider 
first the set of opportunities available to the worker. A firm’s offer curve reflects the costs borne 
by an employer for making a work environment less risky. For any given level of profit, a firm 
must offer a worker less compensation if it invests in improved safety. This means that the 
offered wage will decline as the risk level declines.  
For a given worker, there is a variety of combinations of wage and occupational mortality 
risk over which the worker is indifferent. Which firm the worker will choose and which 
combination of wages and risk will be most desirable will depend on the worker’s willingness to 
bear risk. The market equilibrium for each worker is at the best attainable combination of wage 
and risk from the choice set available to the worker. The observed combinations of wage and risk 
chosen by different workers all reflect the optimal choices for each worker from the available 
choice set.  
The set of observed market equilibria for a large number of workers yields a set of wage-
fatality risk combinations in the labor market, or a relationship between the wage w and risk p 
given by w(p). The slope of this w(p) curve represents workers’ willingness to pay for a marginal 
reduction in risk as well as firms’ marginal cost for providing more safety. The curve w(p) does 
not reflect the wage-risk tradeoff for a particular individual but rather the average rates of wage-
                                                 
7 Individuals likewise reveal their income-risk preferences in product markets, and this discussion is applicable to 
hedonic product market analysis as well. 
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risk tradeoffs across people. It is neither a demand curve nor a supply curve, but rather reflects 
the joint influence of supply and demand.  
This wage-risk relationship is usually estimated through a regression analysis of a 
standard wage equation, where the wage rate is a function of the worker’s personal and job 
characteristics and the occupational fatality risk for the worker.  
i i i i i p X H w ε γ β β α + + ′ + ′ + = 2 1 ) ln( ,   (1) 
where   is the natural logarithm of the worker i’s wage rate,  ) ln( i w H  is a vector of the worker’s 
personal characteristics,   is a vector of the worker’s job characteristics,   is the occupational 
fatality risk for this worker, and 
X i p
i ε  is the random error reflecting unmeasured factors influencing 
the worker’s wage rate.8 The terms  , α , 1 β , 2 β  and γ  are parameters estimated through 
regression analysis. The personal characteristics typically include measures of human capital, 
such as education and experience, and other factors, such as union status. The job characteristics 
often include indicators for whether the job is blue-collar, white-collar, management, etc. The 
estimated coefficient on the occupational mortality risk variable reflects the willingness to pay to 
reduce mortality risk.  
Many of the advances in the literature have involved refinements in the specification of 
this regression equation. Considerable attention has been focused on the fatality risk variable. As 
better data have become available, researchers have made the risk values age-specific. 
Recognition of the theoretical dependence of VSL on life-cycle consumption has led researchers 
to incorporate measures of consumption into the worker’s personal characteristics. At a more 
fundamental level, there have been explorations of whether the equation is different for workers 
of different ages. Do older workers face different offer curves as well as exhibiting different 
preferences? 
Recent research has investigated the existence of a single market equilibrium versus 
multiple equilibria for wage-risk tradeoffs (Viscusi and Aldy 2006). Because the willingness to 
pay varies with age, a 40 year old may require higher labor compensation for a given level of 
occupational mortality risk than an otherwise equivalent 60 year old. Thus, as a worker ages, he 
may change his location along this wage-risk curve. In addition, empirical evidence indicates 
that older workers are more likely to die on the job than younger workers (Viscusi and Aldy, 
                                                 
8 Some papers in this literature also include measures of non-fatal injury risk and workers’ compensation benefits. 
Refer to Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for more details. 
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2006). Firms may respond to older workers' lower safety “productivity” in the work environment 
by adjusting compensation relative to "safer" younger workers. Because firms can easily monitor 
the ages of their workers, they can offer wage-risk combinations that vary according to this age-
related safety productivity. Thus, both workers’ expected utility curves and firms’ offer curves 
vary with the age of workers, which means that different wage-risk market equilibria for 
different age groups could emerge. Section 5 reports on empirical analyses of this age-specific 
willingness to pay to reduce mortality risk in labor markets.  
Section 3: Estimating the Value of a Statistical Life Year 
An intuitively appealing and seemingly neutral approach to the variation in VSL with age 
is to assume that each year of life has the same value. Based on this formulation, it is possible to 
construct models from the basic theory described above in which the researcher estimates the 
VSL as well as the worker’s rate of time preference, r. These estimates can then be used to derive 
the value of a statistical life year (VSLY) based on how the worker values the discounted years 
of remaining life. In addition to assuming that each year of life over the life cycle has the same 
value, this general approach assumes that the VSL can be expressed as the present discounted 
value of these annual amounts. Changes in wealth levels, family responsibilities, health status, 
and other aspects of one’s life cycle are among the factors that in practice will lead to differences 
in how one values survival at different ages. How reasonable the VSLY approach is depends on 
how the value of each year of life actually changes over the life cycle. 
The specific model developed by Moore and Viscusi (1988) is a simple quantity-adjusted 
value of life in which the VSL tracks this series of annualized values. Let VSLY be the value of 
a statistical life year. The VSL is the present value of all the VSLY levels throughout the 
remainder of the person’s life. If people lived forever, then VSL would equal the discounted 
present value of an infinite stream of constantly valued annual VSLY levels. With a finite life 
expectancy, it is necessary to account for the fact that the stream of VSLY amounts is not 
infinite, as VSL will not include the VSLY values after the person’s expected future lifetime.9 
                                                 
9 Thus, there is a deduction for a finite lifespan so that  .
) 1 (
1
⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡
+
− =
r
VSLY
r r
VSLY
VSL L  Alternatively, it is 
possible to solve this equation for VSLY as a function of the estimated rate of discount r, leading to 
] ) 1 ( 1 [ ) (
L r VSL r VSLY
− + − = . 
 
8Resources for the Future  Aldy and Viscusi 
The VSLY estimation approaches used in this context have all involved different variants 
of hedonic wage equations. The main difference between the simplest VSLY models and 
standard VSL estimates is that the fatality risk variable in the wage equation is replaced by the 
remaining discounted years of life. This formulation leads to empirical estimates of a value per 
discounted year of life and the rate of discount implied by workers’ valuations. The valuation per 
discounted year of life lost and the rate of time preference that workers reveal through their 
willingness to risk future losses in life expectancy due to hazardous work are both estimated as 
part of this methodology.10
 The most plausible labor market estimates involve VSLY values in the $300,000 range. 
The models differ in their sophistication, as several of the studies impose quite complex 
theoretical structures on the estimation process. This complexity comes at a price, as many of 
these studies yield surprisingly high estimates of VSLY due to the high estimated rates of time 
preference.11  
How would one use the VSLY results for policy assessment purposes if one selected a 
VSLY level of $300,000 based on these results? Let’s suppose the policy context is an 
environmental risk reduction that decreases the mortality risk to people of different ages. For 
those with one year to live, a reduction in their risk of death would have a VSL equal to VSLY, 
or $300,000. For those with 2 years of remaining life expectancy, the pertinent VSL is 
[ ) 1 ( 1 1 000 , 300 r + + ]
                                                
, where r is the worker’s rate of time preference. One could similarly 
construct the VSL levels by age for all age groups. 
The results of such a procedure for ages zero to 100 are shown in Figure 1, which 
illustrates the strong dependence of these VSL levels on age. The life tables used for these 
calculations are based on average age-specific values for the entire U.S. population. With all 
such life tables, one’s remaining life expectancy decreases with each year of age but by less than 
one year.12 The expected continuous, dramatic decline in VSL with age resulting from the VSLY 
approach is borne out in the results in Figure 1. As was discussed above, while there are some 
theoretical models that predict steadily declining VSLs with age, particularly if there are perfect 
 
10 Appendix Table A1 summarizes five papers that have followed this general approach. 
11 The outlier nature of several of these studies also may be due to the idiosyncratic character of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), which often leads to unusually large VSL estimates. 
12 In making those calculations we used a discount rate of 3 percent, which is consistent with recommended OMB 
policy (OMB Circular A-4). 
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capital markets and annuity markets that one can access at birth, most models predict the 
inverted-U pattern in which VSL may rise as well as decline with age. Consequently, it is 
essential to test empirically whether the strong assumptions of the VSLY approach do in fact 
hold. We address this issue in the subsequent sections. 
Section 4: Literature on Age Variations in VSL 
There is a considerable literature that has examined wage equations that include an age-
dependent VSL in the analysis. This section considers several wage models that include an 
industry-wide or occupation-wide job risk variable, which enters the wage equation (equation 1 
above) after being interacted with various age variables.13 The simplest of these models employ 
interactions of fatality risk with age or age squared, while others use a series of age group 
categories.  
Age-Fatality Risk Interactions 
The earliest approach to age-dependent VSL in the literature involved the interaction of 
the fatality risk variable with age. If the VSL declines with age, then the coefficient on the age-
risk variable should be negative. If the age-VSL relationship is more complex (e.g., an inverted-
U shape), then the age dependence may not be evident in a model with a simple age interaction, 
and a more flexible interactive form is required.14  
Beginning with the study by Thaler and Rosen (1975), who analyzed age interactions 
with fatality rates of people in different occupations, the estimated age interactions found in the 
literature are consistently negative and significant.15 The lone exception in this literature is Meng 
and Smith (1990), who found an insignificant effect with Canadian data. However, Meng (1989) 
found a significant negative effect for an earlier Canadian data set. The property value study by 
Portney (1981) also found a negative age-risk interaction and a declining VSL with age. Each of 
the labor market studies yields implausible negative VSLs for some of the older workers in their 
samples, indicating that the simple age-risk interaction may constrain a more complex 
                                                 
13 All the studies we discuss pertain to developed countries. However, there have been similar labor market studies 
for developing countries as well. 
14 Appendix Table A2 summarizes the results of studies that include an age-fatality risk interaction term. 
15 Viscusi (1979) finds a statistically significant and negative result for the interaction of age with workers’ 
subjective risk beliefs. 
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underlying relationship between age and VSL. The specification used by Aldy and Viscusi 
(2003) results in an inverted-U shape, but the peak occurs relatively early in the life cycle, at  
age 29.  
These interactive age effects are suggestive but do not resolve the age-VSL dependence 
issue. There are three principal caveats. First, all these studies assign the same fatality risk 
variable to all workers in an industry or occupation irrespective of age. Suppose that the jobs of 
older workers within a given industry are safer on average. If older workers have the same 
willingness to bear risk and VSL as younger workers, as exemplified by their fatality risk-wage 
tradeoffs, wage premiums for older workers will be lower. Because the aggregate risk variable 
overstates their age-specific risk, the econometric evidence will indicate a declining VSL with 
age. Thus, lower VSLs for older workers could arise from measurement error that biases the 
results by age. Second, the age-fatality risk interactions impose a rigid linear structure on the 
age-VSL dependence. The actual relationship may be nonlinear, including rising and falling 
segments that will be smoothed out by a simple age interaction. Third, hedonic estimates do not 
capture worker preferences alone, but reflect the joint interaction of the age-dependent market 
offer curves of firms and the age-dependent worker indifference curves. There also may be 
important age differences in safety-related productivity. Both supply and demand for risky jobs 
may vary with age. So, ideally the estimation should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
these variations.  
Fatality Risk Coefficients by Age Group 
A more recent set of studies of age did not resolve all the complications arising from the 
influence of age on the labor market equilibrium but did permit the estimation process to have a 
greater degree of age variation in VSL. Smith et al. (2004) included a series of interactions with 
age group categorical variables for ages 26 to 44, 45 to 50, 51 to 55, 56 to 60, and 61 to 65. 
Using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data by industry16 matched to workers in the Health and 
Retirement Study,17 Smith et al. (2004) found intriguing and somewhat surprising age-VSL 
results. For the age groups 24–44 and 45–50, they found negative and significant effects that 
implied quite large negative VSLs, on the order of minus $20 million. The large negative VSLs 
are inconsistent with economic theory. Smith et al. (2004) also found positive and statistically 
                                                 
16 These BLS data were the precursor to the more recent Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries. 
17 For more information about the HRS, refer to http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/.  
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significant effects for older workers aged 61 to 65, with a quite large VSL of $14 million in 1999 
dollars. Taken at face value, the results suggest that the VSL rises rather than falls with age. The 
authors attribute this result to the lower risk tolerance of older workers. 
In a related paper, Evans and Smith (2006) use the Health and Retirement Survey 
coupled with BLS risk data to explore age variations in risk beliefs, such as longevity 
expectations. Although the authors do not report VSL estimates, they do analyze the variation in 
risk beliefs with age. They conclude that the process of forming risk beliefs varies with age and 
may account for their earlier results concerning the estimated age dependence of VSL. 
Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak (2006) recast the hedonic wage equation in terms of its 
theoretical foundations. A main theoretical determinant of the VSL variation with age is the 
dependence of VSL on the pattern of life-cycle consumption. As a result, the authors include 
food and housing consumption or total consumption in the wage equation and analyze VSL over 
the life cycle. The data used are the Panel Study of Income Dynamics coupled with refined 
fatality risk data using the new BLS Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI).18 Using these 
newly available fatality risk data, the authors were able to construct a refined job risk variable 
calculated for a set of 720 industry-occupation categories. Though the risk measure is not 
explicitly age-dependent, to the extent that older workers are in safer occupations within a given 
industry, the variable will reflect age differences in risk. 
Their estimated overall life-cycle pattern of VSL reflects an inverted-U shape, which is 
consistent with theoretical models in which capital markets are not perfect. The main novelty of 
this analysis is that including consumption flattens out the age-VSL relationship for the older age 
groups. Thus, the VSL rises with age, peaks in one’s early fifties, and remains fairly stable but a 
bit lower thereafter. These results do not suggest a steadily rising VSL pattern as in Smith et al. 
(2004). Nor do they indicate that the rise in VSL is followed by a steep downturn. Rather there is 
a plateau that is just below the peak VSL level. 
Section 5: Age-VSL Relationship Using Age-Specific Occupational Mortality Rates 
The studies discussed in the previous section all employ standard measures of 
occupational mortality risk based on the industry or occupational affiliation of workers. In these 
studies, a 20 year old manufacturing worker is assumed to face the same probability of dying on 
                                                 
18 For more information about the CFOI, refer to: http://www.bls.gov/iif/home.htm.  
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the job as a 60 year old worker in the same manufacturing industry. Two recent papers develop a 
more refined measure of mortality risk that varies by industry affiliation and worker age (Aldy 
and Viscusi 2006, Viscusi and Aldy 2006). This age-specific risk measure allows for a more 
specific matching of mortality risks to workers and can improve the estimation of the age-VSL 
relationship. These papers also employ more flexible statistical models that better reflect how the 
VSL changes over the life cycle. 
Age-Specific Fatality Rates by Industry 
In Aldy and Viscusi (2006) and Viscusi and Aldy (2006), we match the occupational 
mortality risk measure constructed from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Census of Fatal 
Occupational Injuries to full-time workers in the Current Population Survey19 by 2-digit industry 
affiliation and one of six age groups. We do the same for a comparably constructed nonfatal 
injury risk measure. The overall industry levels follow expected patterns: workers in the 
construction and transportation industries face higher mortality risks than those in the financial 
sector or in service jobs. Within industries, workers are less likely to suffer a nonfatal injury on 
the job as they age, which is consistent with workers sorting themselves into safer jobs as their 
wealth increases with age. This age effect also may reflect the benefit of experience and learning 
how to mitigate occupational injury risks. The surprising result is that if older workers are 
injured, the injuries are likely to be more severe and they are much more likely to die on the job 
than younger workers. As a result, the job-related fatality rate is higher for older workers than 
younger workers. 
Figure 2 illustrates how job fatality risks change with worker age for several major 
industry groups.20 The rising pattern of fatality risks by age is widespread throughout the 
economy. The average 60 year old manufacturing worker is 80 percent more likely to die on the 
job than the average 30 year old. Across virtually every industry, on-the-job mortality risk 
increases with age and peaks for those over the age of 55. This same pattern of rising risks with 
age holds whether considering workers within occupational age groups or by industry affiliation. 
This does not appear to be the product of the increase in all-cause mortality with age. The 
                                                 
19 The CPS is the federal government’s monthly survey of labor market participation by approximately 60,000 
households that is used, inter alia, to estimate the unemployment rate. Using the CPS provides a much larger sample 
than typically used in such analyses and facilitates our age-specific analyses. 
20 Mining is omitted because the mortality risk is off our risk scale. The age pattern for mining sector mortality rate 
peaks in the 18–24 age group, declines until age 35–44 age group, and then increases with age thereafter. 
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increase in occupational mortality risk with age, which is less than a doubling of risk between 
ages 30 and 60, is much smaller than the nearly ten-fold increase in the probability of dying from 
all causes over this 30-year period of the life cycle (Arias 2004). Moreover, the occupational 
mortality data do not include heart attacks and other causes of death that may occur at the 
workplace but are unrelated to the job.  
This age-occupational mortality pattern, however, does not hold for non-fatal injuries: the 
probability of a lost-workday injury declines with age for most industries (Viscusi and Aldy 
2006). An older worker is, on average, less likely to be injured. But if he is injured, he is much 
more likely to die than a younger worker. Thus, the age-pattern of fatalities appears not to reflect 
older workers’ decisions to take riskier jobs, but rather the greater probability that a workplace 
accident will be severe for older workers.  
This variation by age in the safety productivity of workers is important in the context of 
the wage determination process presented in the second section of this paper. An employer can 
easily observe a worker’s age. If an older worker is more susceptible to costly, life-threatening 
occupational accidents in a given job, an employer can adjust the offered labor compensation to 
account for this difference in safety productivity. Similarly, older workers may demand less 
compensation for mortality risks than otherwise equivalent younger workers because they have 
fewer years of life expectancy. The shifts with age of both labor supply and labor demand can 
result in not one hedonic market equilibrium for labor compensation and job mortality risk, but a 
series of market equilibria for different age groups.  
Age and Cohort Effects 
To investigate this possibility, in Aldy and Viscusi (2006) we estimate and compare age-
specific VSLs using the Current Population Survey over most of the 1990s. In particular, we 
estimate VSLs for five age groups—18–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, and 55–62—over the 1993–
2000 period. As shown in Table 1, there is substantial heterogeneity in the VSL with respect to 
age, but there are also common trends across years. The VSL always peaks for either the 35–44 
age group (6 times) or the 25–34 age group (twice). This pattern reflects an inverted-U 
relationship between age and the VSL, as the 18–24 and 55–62 age groups have VSL estimates 
that are always substantially lower than and, in most years, statistically distinct from the higher 
VSLs for the 25-34 and 35-44 age groups. The workers in the oldest age group in our sample 
have, on average, VSLs that are half of the peak VSL.  
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Comparing a 30 year old worker’s VSL to a 60 year old worker’s VSL in a cross-
sectional analysis may capture differences in VSLs across generations, but it may not accurately 
reflect the VSLs for a given cohort or age group as it ages through the life cycle. For example, a 
60 year old may have a lower VSL than a 30 year old, in part because the fairly steady increase 
in economic growth over the years suggests that an average worker born in 1970 should expect 
greater lifetime income than an average worker born in 1940. The higher lifetime income would 
positively influence how much workers in the younger cohort would be willing to pay to reduce 
mortality risk. In addition, with improvements in health care over time, a worker born in 1970 
may expect to live longer than a worker born in 1940. 
To complement the cross-sectional analyses presented in Table 1, we have also estimated 
age-VSL relationships that account for the year of birth of the workers in our sample (Aldy and 
Viscusi 2006). These results show that the VSL does increase with year of birth, consistent with 
the notion of incomes and life expectancy increasing over time. The age-VSL relationship still 
follows an inverted-U shape, but accounting for year of birth effectively rotates the shape so that 
younger workers now have a lower VSL; the curve peaks a little later in life (at age 46), and 
older workers now have a higher VSL. The oldest worker in our sample (age 62) has a VSL that 
is 35 percent lower than a 46 year old worker’s VSL, the peak value in this analysis. This 
approach allows us to distinguish pure age effects from age-related cohort effects such as income 
and life expectancy.  
The decision about whether to account for age variation in on-the-job mortality risk 
influences both the statistical analysis of labor market compensating wage differentials and 
applications of the estimated VSLs to policy evaluation. Viscusi and Aldy (2006) compare age 
group VSLs based on the standard 3-digit industry measure of mortality risk and the novel 2-
digit industry risk measure by age group. The choice of the job risk measure does not 
substantially affect estimates of the average compensating wage differential for the entire sample 
of workers age 18 to 62 years, but it does affect the variation in VSL by age. As previously 
noted, the age-specific industry risk measure results in VSLs that increase with age until they 
peak for workers when they are in their late 30s-early 40s and then decrease thereafter. The 
industry-only risk measure applies a lower risk measure to most older workers than does the age-
specific industry risk measure and results in VSLs for 55–62 year olds that are higher than for 
workers in the 25–34 age group. Using the average mortality risk for the industry introduces 
systematic error into the statistical analysis—it results in younger workers having a higher risk 
measure and older workers a lower risk measure than what they typically experience. This means 
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that VSLs will be overestimated for older workers and underestimated for workers in their 30s 
and 40s.  
Section 6: Policy Implications of Labor Market Age-Specific VSLs 
The studies discussed in the previous sections have several key policy implications for 
monetizing the benefits of mortality risk reduction. First, choice of the cross-sectional age-VSL 
function versus the cohort-adjusted age-VSL functions depends on the policy evaluation task. An 
economic analysis of a policy that reduces mortality risks across the population today should 
employ the cross-sectional age-VSL function. The cross-sectional relationship reflects the 
current tradeoffs between mortality risk and income for the current population. However, if a risk 
reduction policy generates benefits over a long period of time, such as with a two-decade latency 
period for cancer risks, it may be more appropriate to apply the cohort-adjusted VSLs for today’s 
young adults who will become the future’s older individuals. Our analysis rejects the assumption 
underlying the current widespread approach of the U.S. government, which is that VSL is 
constant across the population irrespective of age. 
Second, using these age-specific VSLs to monetize the benefits of environmental policies 
does have a significant effect. An instructive illustration of the influence of age adjustments and 
the “senior discount” for VSL can be found in the analysis of the Clear Skies initiative prepared 
by EPA (2002). The EPA’s use of a senior discount for VSL in an exploration of the sensitivity 
of the benefit estimates to different assumptions vaulted the age adjustment issue into policy 
prominence. We have applied our estimates of the VSL-age relationship to EPA’s analysis of the 
Clear Skies initiative and compare the results to the estimates developed by EPA (see Table 2). 
We recognize that the illustrative estimates presented here may be refined in subsequent studies 
in much the same way as the original VSL estimates have become refined through dozens of 
studies in the literature. This comparison shows that one’s decision to apply the average VSL of 
all workers, a fixed fraction of the average VSL of all workers (EPA’s original “senior 
discount”), the average VSL for workers 55-62, or the VSLY derived from an average VSL to 
individuals 65 and older has a significant impact on the estimated benefits of mortality risk 
reduction.21
                                                 
21 Simulation studies from Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) through Aldy and Smyth (2007) show that the VSL of 
those 65 and older is lower than the average of all workers and the average of the 55–62 age group. 
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Table 2 presents a summary of the key risk benefits information based on the VSLs 
estimated by both EPA and Viscusi and Aldy (2006). EPA prepared two sets of mortality risk 
estimates—base estimates based on a long-term exposure assumption and alternative estimates 
based on short-term exposures. In each case, the analysis distinguished reduced mortality effects 
for two different age groups, those 18–64 and people age 65 and older. As is indicated by the 
first column of reduced fatalities, most of the reduced fatalities are among the 65 and over 
population, so the application of any kind of senior discount will have a potentially substantial 
effect on benefits. The second column of estimates values the reduced fatalities using a constant 
VSL of $6.3 million. The main basis for this EPA estimate is an assessment of labor market 
estimates of VSL, so in that respect our analysis of age variations in VSL is quite germane to the 
EPA benefits assessment (see EPA 1997 and Viscusi 1993). The constant VSL estimates and 
subsequent calculations assume that the willingness to pay for fatality risk reductions does not 
vary with the quality of life and life expectancy of those being protected. In practice, that may 
not be the case if, for example, people with advanced respiratory ailments are the main 
beneficiaries of the policy. The EPA senior discount estimates do not affect the assessed benefits 
for those under age 65, but do alter the benefits for the 65 and older population. EPA assumed a 
37 percent reduction in VSL for those 70 and over, reducing the total long-term exposure 
benefits assessment for this group from $37.8 billion to $23.8 billion. This change reduces the 
overall policy benefits by 28 percent.  
To illustrate the effect of using our results, we assume that the mortality reductions for 
the under-65 population are distributed evenly by age, that the pertinent VSL is the estimated 
age-specific VSL for this population, and that the VSL for the age 55-62 is the same as that of 
the older group affected by the policy. This approach leads to a negligible reduction in the EPA’s 
estimate of long-term exposure benefits for those under 65, from $12.0 to $11.8 billion, and it 
reduces the 65 and older benefit value to $22.1 billion. Thus, these labor market estimates imply 
a very similar benefits reduction of only 5 percent relative to that obtained by EPA in its senior 
discount analysis. Benefits to those 65 and older comprise about two-thirds of the total benefits 
in the senior discount analysis and our age-specific VSL analysis, as compared to 76 percent 
with a constant VSL. The VSL estimates by age that use industry job fatality estimates, but do 
not account for the influence of age differences on risk, yield much higher benefit estimates.  
To estimate the risk reduction benefits using the VSLY approach, we have annuitized 
EPA’s $6.3 million VSL using a discount rate of 3 percent, which yields a VSLY of about 
$275,000. Applying VSLYs to the age-specific risk reductions based on 2002 life expectancy has 
a modest impact on the under 65 benefits—a decline from $12 billion to $11.5 billion. In 
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contrast, VSLYs have the lowest risk reduction benefits for the 65 and older population, with an 
estimate of less than $16 billion.  
We do have some reservations about the VSLY approach. First, as we note above, an 
age-invariant VSLY holds only under the strong assumption of constant consumption over the 
life cycle. Second, our age-specific VSLs are consistent with an inverted-U pattern for VSLY 
with respect to age (Aldy and Viscusi 2006). EPA and other government agencies have 
previously monetized risk reduction benefits based on the number of life years saved. However, 
the statistical tests in our work reject this notion of a constant, age-invariant VSLY as used in 
prior government analyses and in EPA’s assessment of the Clear Skies initiative. 
This exercise has illustrated the sensitivity of various options for benefits transfer. For 
example, applying a VSL for the 55-62 age group to an older age group may overestimate the 
benefits, based on the life-cycle pattern for 18-62 year olds estimated in Aldy and Viscusi (2006) 
and simulation work by Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) and Aldy and Smyth (2007). This policy 
evaluation exercise also shows the differences between the standard benefits transfer, based on 
the average VSL of the entire population, and an application of a near-elderly VSL to the 
affected elderly population.  
Age differences in the pertinent VSL for benefit assessment first emerged in a policy 
context for environmental policies. Because many EPA programs reduce risks at the tails of the 
population distribution, it is not surprising that the senior discount issue surfaced with respect to 
environmental policies rather than, for example, occupational safety regulations. The fact that 
benefits to senior citizens comprised the lion’s share of the policy benefits for the Clear Skies 
initiative instigated this controversy. 
Heterogeneity in VSL levels is expected from a theoretical standpoint, but making the 
VSL for a group systematically lower, as EPA did in its analysis of the Clear Skies initiative, 
introduces distinctions that will surely be controversial even if well founded. The negative 
direction of the change in valuation of older people’s lives, rather than the recognition of 
heterogeneity in VSL, may have accounted for the public uproar that the benefit assessment 
created. If EPA had instead placed a premium on the lives of children whose risks would be 
reduced by the policy, it is likely that few would have objected.  
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Section 7: Conclusion 
Whether the VSL should vary by age is not a matter of equity or political expediency. 
Rather it should be grounded on estimates of how people’s willingness to pay for risk reduction 
varies with age. As we age, our life expectancy shortens, but our economic resources vary as 
well, giving rise to a theoretical indeterminacy in the age-VSL relationship.  
The implicit valuations of risk revealed through labor market decisions resolve some, but 
not all, outstanding issues. First, it is clear that VSL does vary with age. The labor market VSL 
increases with age, peaks in mid-life, and subsequently declines. The decline later in life appears 
to be flatter than the early-adult life increase for models that recognize either cohort effects or 
life-cycle consumption patterns. Second, the popular perception that the VSL must be less for a 
60 year old than for a 20 year old because of the differences in life expectancy is not borne out. 
However, a 60 year old does appear to have a lower VSL than a 30 year old or 40 year old. 
Third, the assumption of a constant value per year of life that underlies the VSLY approach can 
be rejected, as VSLY also rises and then subsequently declines over the life cycle. Finally, 
applying a VSL for those in their late 50s and early 60s to an even older population would appear 
to introduce less error than the current practice of applying the average VSL for the entire 
population; age-specific VSLs have little impact on total under-65 mortality risk reduction 
benefits, but have a substantial influence on the benefits for the 65 and older population.  
Pinpointing the VSL at different ages will require further research, including evidence 
other than market-based revealed preference studies. However, the broad outlines of the age-
VSL relationship are clear. Developing this research agenda can further inform and improve the 
evaluation of mortality risk reduction policies across government agencies. Understanding how 
willingness to pay to reduce risk varies with age will facilitate better prioritization of risk 
reduction efforts for populations of various ages. Proper recognition of the heterogeneity of VSL 
can promote the goal of securing the greatest social benefit for a dollar of investment in reducing 
mortality risk.
 
19Resources for the Future  Aldy and Viscusi 
References
Aldy, Joseph E., and Seamus J. Smyth. 2007. A numerical model of the value of life. RFF 
Discussion Paper 07-09. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
Aldy, Joseph E., and W. Kip Viscusi. 2006. Adjusting the value of a statistical life for age and 
cohort effects. RFF Discussion Paper 06-19. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.  
——— . 2003. Age variations in workers’ value of statistical life. NBER Working Paper 10199. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Arias, E. 2004. United States life tables, 2002. National Vital Statistics Reports 53(6). 
Arnould, Richard J., and Len M. Nichols. 1983. Wage-risk premiums and workers’ 
compensation: a refinement of estimates of compensating wage differential. Journal of 
Political Economy. 91(2): 332–340. 
Baranzini, Andrea and Giovanni Ferro Luzzi. 2001. The economic value of risks to life: evidence 
from the Swiss labour market. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics. 137(2): 149–
170. 
Dillingham, Alan E., Ted Miller, and David T. Levy. 1996. A more general and unified measure 
for valuing labour market risk. Applied Economics. 28: 537–542. 
Dreyfus, Mark K., and W. Kip Viscusi. 1995. Rates of time preference and consumer valuations 
of automobile safety and efficiency. Journal of Law and Economics. 38(1): 79–105. 
Ehrlich, Isaac, and Yong Yin. 2005. Explaining diversities in age-specific life expectancies and 
values of life saving: a numerical analysis. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 31(2): 129–
162. 
Environmental Protection Agency. 1997. The benefits and costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 
1990. Washington, DC: EPA. 
———. 1999. Regulatory impact analysis—control of air pollution from new motor vehicles: 
tier 2 motor vehicle emissions standards and gasoline sulfur control requirements. Report 
EPA420-R-99-023. December. Washington, DC: EPA. 
———. 2002. Technical addendum: methodologies for the benefits analysis of the Clear Skies 
Act of 2002. September. Washington, DC: EPA. 
 ———. 2003. Technical addendum: methodologies for the benefits analysis of the Clear Skies 
Act of 2003. September. Washington, DC: EPA. 
 
20Resources for the Future  Aldy and Viscusi 
European Commission. 2001. Recommended interim values for the value of preventing a fatality 
in DG Environment cost benefit analysis. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enveco/others/recommended_interim_values.pdf  
Evans, Mary R., and V. Kerry Smith. 2006. Do we really understand the age-VSL relationship? 
Resource and Energy Economics. 28: 242–261. 
Hara Associates Inc. 2000. Benefit/cost analysis of proposed tobacco products information 
regulations. Prepared for Health Canada and Consulting and Audit Canada. Ottawa, 
Ontario, June 5, 2000. 
Johansson, Per-Olov. 2002. On the definition and age-dependency of the value of a statistical 
life. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 25(3): 251–263. 
——— . 1996. On the value of changes in life expectancy. Journal of Health Economics. 15: 
105–113. 
Jones-Lee, Michael W. 1976. The value of life: an economic analysis. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Kniesner, Thomas J., W. Kip Viscusi, and James P. Ziliak. 2006. Life-cycle consumption and the 
age-adjusted value of life. Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy. 5(1), B.E. Press. 
Krupnick, Alan. 2007. Mortality-Risk Valuation and Age: Stated Preference Evidence. Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy. 1(2): forthcoming. 
Meng, Ronald. 1989. Compensating differences in the Canadian labour market. Canadian 
Journal of Economics. 22(2): 413–424. 
Meng, Ronald A., and Douglas A. Smith. 1990. The valuation of risk and death in public sector 
decision-making. Canadian Public Policy—Analyse de Politiques. 16 (2): 137–144. 
Moore, Michael J., and W. Kip Viscusi. 1988. The quantity-adjusted value of life. Economic 
Inquiry. 26: 369–388. 
——— . 1990a. Discounting environmental health risks: new evidence and policy implications. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 18: 551–562. 
———. 1990b. Models for estimating discount rates for long-term health risks using labor 
market data. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 3: 381–401. 
Portney, Paul R. 1981. Housing prices, health effects, and valuing reductions in risk of death. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 8: 72–78. 
 
21Resources for the Future  Aldy and Viscusi 
 
22
Shanmugam, K.R. 1996/7. The value of life: estimates from Indian labour market. Indian 
Economic Journal. 44(4): 105–114. 
Shanmugam, K.R. 2001. Self selection bias in the estimates of compensating differentials for job 
risks in India. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 22(3): 263–275. 
Shepard, Donald S., and Richard J. Zeckhauser. 1984. Survival versus consumption. 
Management Science. 30(4): 423–439. 
Smith, Adam. 1776. The Wealth of Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 
Smith, V. Kerry, Mary F. Evans, Hyun Kim, and Donald H. Taylor. 2004. Do the ‘near’ elderly 
value mortality risks differently? Review of Economics and Statistics. 86(1): 423–429. 
Thaler, Richard, and Sherwin Rosen. 1975. The value of saving a life: evidence from the labor 
market. In Household production and consumption, ed. N.E. Terleckyj, 265–300. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Viscusi, W. Kip. 1979. Employment hazards: an investigation of market performance. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
———. 1993. The value of risks to life and health. Journal of Economic Literature. 31: 1912–
1946. 
Viscusi, W. Kip, and Joseph E. Aldy. 2006. Labor market estimates of the senior discount for the 
value of statistical life. RFF Discussion Paper 06-12. Washington, DC: Resources for the 
Future. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Forthcoming. 
———. 2003. The value of a statistical life: a critical review of market estimates throughout the 
world. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 27(1): 5–76. 
Viscusi, W. Kip, and Michael J. Moore. 1989. Rates of time preference and valuations of the 
duration of life. Journal of Public Economics. 38: 297–317. Resources for the Future  Aldy and Viscusi 
 
   
Table 1. Age Group-Specific Values of a Statistical Life (VSLs), Annual Cross-Sections, 1993–2000 
Year 18-24
Age Group 
25-34 
Age Group 
35-44 
Age Group 
45-54 
Age Group 
55-62 
Age Group 
1993            $0.64 $9.92 $8.36 $2.04 $2.36
1994           
           
           
           
           
           
           
$3.97 $7.73 $7.75 $3.86 $4.87
1995 $4.87 $7.31 $6.16 $5.02 $4.46
1996 $5.13 $8.08 $8.45 $4.67 $3.39
1997 $4.60 $8.08 $8.98 $5.64 $4.47
1998 $5.65 $6.76 $8.61 $4.69 $4.55
1999 $2.18 $7.18 $8.41 $8.35 $3.95
2000 $3.16 $9.03 $9.85 $7.97 $3.77
NOTES: VSLs are expressed in millions of year 2000 dollars based on age-specific wages. 
 
23 Resources for the Future  Aldy and Viscusi 
Table 2. Summary of Clear Skies Initiative Benefits Based on EPA VSLs vs. VSLs Estimated by Viscusi and Aldy (2006) 
    Benefits of Reduced Mortality 
(2000$, billions, undiscounted) 
Age Group  Reduced Annual 
Fatalities in 
2010 
Constant 
Value of Life 
(EPA 2003) 
Senior 
Discount  
(EPA 2002) 
Value Based on 
Age-Industry 
Fatality Risk VSL 
Estimates 
Value Based on 
Industry Fatality 
Risk VSL 
Estimates 
VSLY Based 
on EPA’s 
Constant VSL 
Base Estimates – Long-Term Exposure: 
Adults, 18-64  1,900  12.0  12.0  11.8  16.5  11.5 
Adults, 65 and older  6,000  37.8  23.8  22.1  45.7  15.9 
Alternative Estimates – Short-Term Exposure: 
Adults, 18-64  1,100  6.9  6.9  6.7  9.5  6.7 
Adults, 65 and older  3,600  22.7  14.3  16.4  30.1  9.5 
NOTES: EPA (2003) provides the reduced annual fatalities in 2010 data (p. 64) and the constant value of life of $6.1 million (1999 dollars; p. 34). EPA 
(2002) provides the senior discount conversion factor of 0.63 (p. 35). The calculation of the benefits for adults aged 18-64 assumes that the reduced 
mortalities are equally distributed by age. Age-specific VSLs, based on the results presented in the specifications in Tables 1B and 2B of Viscusi and Aldy 
(2006), are applied to the estimated mortalities by age and these are aggregated to yield the 18-64 benefits estimates. The VSLs for the 58-62 age group 
estimated in Tables 1B and 2B of Viscusi and Aldy (2006) are applied to the 65 and older mortalities to estimate the benefits for the elderly. The VSLY 
estimates are based on a discount rate of 3 percent and age-specific life expectancy from the 2002 U.S. Life Tables (Arias 2004). 
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Figure 1. Age–VSL Pattern over the Life-Cycle Based on VSLY  
 
NOTES: The age-specific VSLs are constructed by the authors assuming a VSLY of $300,000, a discount rate of 3 percent, and age-specific life expectancy 
based on the 2002 U.S. Life Tables (Arias 2004). 
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Figure 2. Mortality Risk by Age and 1-Digit Industry, 1992–2000  
 
NOTES: Constructed by authors with mortality risk data from the BLS Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, 1992-2000 and CPS MORG data files, 1992-
2000 
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Appendix  
Appendix Table A1. Summary of VSLYs and Estimated Discount Rate Studies 
Year  Author (Year) Type of Study  Sample  Implicit 
Discount Rate
VSLY  
(2000$) 
1988 Moore  and 
Viscusi  
(1988) 
Labor Hedonic with 
Reduced Form 
Discounting Model 
QES 1977  9.6%-12.2%  $269,000 – 
$305,000 
1989 Viscusi  and 
Moore (1989)
Labor Hedonic with 
Structural Markov 
Model 
PSID 1982  10.7%  $1,085,000 – 
$2,261,000 
1990 Moore  and 
Viscusi 
(1990b) 
Labor Hedonic with 
Structural Life Cycle 
Model 
PSID 1982  2%  $739,000 
1990 Moore  and 
Viscusi 
(1990c) 
Labor Hedonic with 
Structural Integrated 
Life Cycle Model 
PSID 1982  1.0%-14.2%  $950,000 
1995 Dreyfus  and 
Viscusi (1995)
Automobile Hedonic  1988 Residential 
Transportation Energy 
Consumption Survey 
11%-17% $415,000  – 
$560,000 
 
Notes: In cases in which the authors reported VSLs and not VSLYs, we annuitized the reported VSL based on an assumption that the 
average age of the sample was 35 years old and used the reported discount rate. We converted all values to year 2000 dollars with the 
CPI-U deflator.
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Appendix Table A2. Results of Hedonic Studies Using Age-Risk Interaction Specifications 
VSL at Given Age  
(millions 2000 US$)  Author (Year)  Age x Risk Variable Coefficient  Average VSL 
(millions 2000 US$) 
25 40 55 
Thaler and Rosen (1975)  Significant (5%), negative  $1.0  $1.89  $0.226  -$1.44 
Portney (1981)  Integrated air pollution mortality 
risk estimates with hedonic 
housing model0 
$1.03 -  $1.5  $0.3 
 
Arnould and Nichols 
(1983) 
Significant (1%), negative  $0.5, $1.3  $24.05  $9.05  -$5.95 
Meng (1989)  Significant (10%), negative  $3.9-$4.7  $8.32  $4.5  $0.69 
Baranzini and Ferro 
Luzzi (2001) 
Significant (1%), negative  $6.3,  
$8.6 
$12.7,  
$17.2 
$7.27,  
$10.7 
$1.89,  
$4.12 
Aldy and Viscusi (2003)  Significant (1%), negative  $4.7  $6.21  $5.14  $1.53 
 
NOTES: The Portney results are for female homeowners under the age of 45 and for those between 45 and 64 years of age. Male homeowners have a similar 
downward trend with age but with lower magnitudes. Meng and Smith (1990) and Shanmugam (1996/7, 2001) report statistically insignificant coefficient 
estimates for age-risk interaction terms. Dillingham et al. (1996) find a positive and statistically significant effect of the length of impaired work life from a 
non-fatal occupational injury on the wage. Refer to Table 10 of Aldy and Viscusi (2003) for more details on these studies. We converted all values to year 
2000 dollars with the CPI-U deflator. 
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